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This thesis analyzes the emerging security role of the European Union (EU) by 
focusing on the prospects for multilateral defense planning in the NATO-EU relationship. 
The EU’s recent decisions about defense planning may well play a crucial role because 
the arrangements in this area will influence the future of both the European Union’s 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and NATO. The successful harmonization 
of defense planning by NATO and the EU could strengthen the transatlantic relationship, 
while failure could be damaging to both institutions and to their mutual relations. 
According to recent EU documents, the European Union’s defense planning activity will 
be limited and therefore it will not have a major impact on NATO’s decision-making and 
defense planning process. The cooperation between EU and NATO experts might have 
positive effects, notably in promoting more efficient use of scarce European resources 
and in providing transparency between the Alliance and the European Union. However, 
the ESDP appears unlikely to persuade the European Union nations to increase their 
defense budgets. It will therefore probably not be able to narrow the significant capability 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In the last decade the European Union (EU) has made enormous progress in the 
field of economic and monetary union. It now intends to pursue its Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), including the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the EU’s emerging security role by focusing on 
the prospects for multilateral defense planning in the NATO-EU relationship. The key 
questions examined in this thesis can be organized in three major groups: 
1. What role did integrated military planning play in NATO during the Cold War? 
How did it contribute to the security of the continent? How has it evolved since 
the Cold War? 
2. What is the current role of defense planning in the EU’s ESDP? How do the EU 
nations plan to pursue multinational defense planning? What is the EU’s political-
military structure and how might this affect NATO’s planning and NATO-EU 
interactions? 
3. What are the key national positions? What are the major obstacles to effective 
NATO-EU cooperation? How does the EU intend to surmount them?  
 
B. IMPORTANCE OF DEFENSE PLANNING 
Defense planning is crucial in multinational security organizations because it 
enables the member nations to work together effectively in military operations. The 
coordination of the plans for the acquisition and improvement of military capabilities 
among the NATO nations dates back to the early 1950s. Over the last fifty years NATO’s 
collective defense planning arrangements have proved to be an effective tool in 
establishing the Alliance’s military power.  
The European Union’s involvement in defense planning is much more recent. In 
December 1999, the participants in the European Council at Helsinki declared the need 
for a rapid reaction military capability for the European Union, the so-called “headline 
2 
goal,” and also established collective capability goals. The European Union’s recent 
involvement in defense planning may well play a crucial role because the arrangements 
in this area will influence the future of both the European Union’s European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP) and NATO. The successful harmonization of defense planning by 
NATO and the EU could strengthen the transatlantic relationship, while failure could be 
damaging to both institutions and to their mutual relations. This failure could in turn 
undermine their ability to protect and advance their shared security interests. 
 
C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSE PLANNING 
The U.S. security guarantee provided by the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 was 
mostly political in nature. The Alliance was based on America’s commitments to the 
security of its allies. In the early years, the Alliance had no integrated standing forces, 
and its initial defense plans were framed in general terms. In addition, it lacked the 
capability to mobilize against a Soviet attack. Although the building of the military 
infrastructure started in the early 1950s, it was the Korean War that dramatically changed 
the situation and led the Allies to transform NATO into a formal political-military 
organization with a standing military command and international staff.1 
Planners in NATO’s integrated military system developed a sophisticated force 
planning mechanism, primarily to coordinate national defense plans and thereby enable 
the Alliance to meet its political goals. The integrated system harmonized national and 
collective defense planning, encouraged interoperability among forces, and promoted 
efficiency in multilateral military operations. Over time, defense planning became a core 
function of NATO and had a far-reaching political effect on the evolution of Western 
Europe. NATO’s multilateral planning process, based on transparency and consultation 
among the members, enabled the Western European allies to focus on economic recovery 
and to avoid costly independent national military buildups.2 This contributed enormously 
to the reconciliation between France and Germany. 
                                                 
1 Lawrence S. Kaplan, The Long Entanglement, NATO’s First Fifty Years (Westport: Praeger, 1999), 
p. 62. 
2 Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc., 1998), pp. 39-40. 
3 
Although U.S. involvement in the multilateral defense planning has given NATO 
credibility, the system has failed to ensure balanced burden-sharing and has reflected a 
US-dominated military posture. Despite continuous NATO efforts since the 1950s, the 
capability gap between the European and American allies has continued to grow. 
NATO’s air campaign in the Kosovo conflict in 1999 drew attention to this capability 
gap, and led prominent Europeans to call for improvements in the military capabilities of 
the European Union countries. 
Under the security umbrella provided by NATO, the integration of Europe has 
made enormous progress in almost every respect, except for military security affairs. 
Europe, and this means especially the integrated organizational framework known as the 
EU has failed to cope effectively with local and limited conflicts on its periphery. Owing 
in part to the impetus of the Kosovo experience in 1998-1999, the EU has since mid-1999 
repeatedly reaffirmed its intention to play a stronger role in security matters. As the 
NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, stated in his November 2000 speech in 
Istanbul, “It should be possible now for this ESDP to finally rectify the deficiencies that 
have plagued both NATO and the EU for years: the asymmetry in the military 
capabilities between the US and Europe, and the lack of an effective and workable 
European crisis management role in cases where NATO as a whole was not engaged.”3 
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) established a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy as the second pillar of the European Union. The Maastricht version of the 
TEU, the first in what has become a series of TEUs, entered into force in November 
1993. It declared that among the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) objectives 
of the Union will be ”to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in 
accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of 
the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external 
borders.”4 
                                                 
3 Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson “Turkey and a European Security and Defence 
Identity,” Istanbul, Turkey 23 November 2000. available at: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s001123a.htm 
4 Title V, Article 11 European Union. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union. 
available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/eu_cons_treaty_en.pdf 
4 
However, in the absence of a common policy the EU failed to cope effectively 
with the crises in the Balkans in the 1990s. In order to promote the development of a 
common policy the Amsterdam Treaty, which was formulated in 1997 and entered into 
force in 1999, incorporated the Western European Union (WEU) “Petersberg tasks” 
(“humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in 
crisis management, including peacemaking”)5 into the TEU and established the position 
of a High Representative for the CFSP.6 The new TEU provided a legal basis for the EU 
to conduct “Petersberg tasks”-type military actions, but there is scarcely anything specific 
in the Treaty as to how the EU will achieve this in practice. Additionally, in referring to 
“the progressive framing of a common defence policy…which might lead to a common 
defence,”7 the text is heavily loaded with conditionality. It was not until the British-
French Summit of 3-4 December 1998 in Saint Malo that an initiative was taken to fulfill 
the military security ambitions of the CFSP. 
In their Joint Declaration at the British-French Summit in Saint Malo, London and 
Paris agreed that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by 
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in 
order to respond to international crises.” It was also envisaged that “the Union must be 
given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of 
intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary 
duplication.”8 
The Cologne European Council (3-4 June 1999) responded to the Saint Malo 
initiative with specific practical decisions. This time it was the European Union as a 
whole that acknowledged the need for a capacity for autonomous action. The Presidency 
                                                 
5 WEU Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, II. On strengthening WEU’s operational role 
para 4. Bonn 19 June 1992. available at: http://www.weu.int/eng/comm/92-petersberg.htm 
6 “Articles 13 and 17 contain the major changes: in particular, the European Council's guidelines for 
the CFSP ‘shall obtain in respect of WEU for those matters for which the Union avails itself of the WEU’; 
and the Petersberg tasks were incorporated into the EU Treaty.” Fact Sheet entitled “WEU and the 
European Union,” available at: http://www.weu.int/eng/info/eu.html 
7 Title V, Article 17, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union. available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/eu_cons_treaty_en.pdf 
8 Joint Declaration, British-French summit Saint Malo, 3-4 December. 1998. in Maartje Rutten, ed., 
From St-Malo to Nice, European Defence: core documents (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 
2001), pp. 8-9. available at: http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai47e.pdf 
5 
Report for the Council (in the Annex on ESDP) outlined in general terms the guiding 
principles, the decision-making process, the implementation options and the modalities of 
participation and cooperation. 9 The endorsement of the Declaration of the European 
Council and the Presidency Report on strengthening the common European policy on 
security and defense in Cologne had also been encouraged, quite explicitly, at the April 
1999 NATO summit in Washington, just two months before the Cologne meeting. In its 
summit communiqué NATO granted the EU what it had not yet asked for: 
“we therefore stand ready to define and adopt the necessary arrangements 
for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and 
capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a 
whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance. The Council in Permanent 
Session will approve these arrangements, which will respect the 
requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command 
structure.”10 
The European Council on 10-11 December 1999 in Helsinki agreed on the 
headline force goals, declaring the need for “military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 
persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks,”11 deployable within 60 days and 
capable of being sustained for at least one year. The Capabilities Commitment 
Conference on 20-21 November 2000 in Brussels drew “together the specific national 
commitments corresponding to the military capability goals set by the Helsinki European 
Council.”12 
The European Council in Nice in December 2000 approved all the texts on ESDP 
and endorsed the establishment of the permanent political and military structures of the 
European Union. 13 In December 2001 the European Council meeting in Laeken declared 
that the “EU is now able to conduct some crisis-management operations” and indicated 
                                                 
9 Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Cologne, 3-4 June 1999. in Maartje Rutten, ed., From 
St-Malo to Nice, pp. 41-45.  
10 NATO Washington Summit communiqué, Washington, D.C., 24 April 1999, para. 10. 
11 Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999, para. 28, in Maartja 
Rutten, ed., From St-Malo to Nice, p. 82. 
12 Capabilities Commitment Declaration, Brussels, 20-21 November 2000, para. 3, in Maartja Rutten, 
ed., From St-Malo to Nice, p. 159. 
13 Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Nice, 7-9 December 2000, Annex VI. in Maartje Rutten 
ed., From St-Malo to Nice, p. 168.  
6 
that the EU will be able to undertake “more demanding operations, as the assets and 
capabilities at its disposal continue to develop.”14 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis is based on the analysis of primary and secondary sources. The primary 
sources include official EU and NATO documents and treaties, official speeches by 
representatives of the EU and NATO, as well as American and European government 
officials. Secondary sources consist of analytical studies, such as the Chaillot Papers and 
RAND reports, and articles published in daily papers and other periodicals dealing with 
security issues. 
The thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter II examines NATO’s 
integrated military force planning structure and process as well as its role in providing 
security. Chapter III reviews NATO and EU efforts to improve the military capabilities of 
the members of NATO and the European Union, as well as the attempts of the European 
NATO allies and the EU to play more significant roles in security matters from the 1990s 
to the present. Chapter IV analyzes the EU’s newly established security structure and the 
NATO-EU common planning process. Chapter V examines the ESDP’s key problems, 
including the capability gap between the American and European allies and budgetary 
issues. Chapter VI offers conclusions. 
 
                                                 
14 Declaration on the Operational Capability of the Common European Security and Defence Policy, 




II. NATO DEFENSE PLANNING DURING THE COLD WAR 
This chapter begins by exploring the roots of NATO’s multinational defense 
planning and its impact on European security. In the beginning NATO did not have an 
integrated military structure. Collective defense planning among the allied countries was 
the result of the growing Soviet threat. When the European nations failed to create a 
European army in the early 1950s, NATO remained the dominant institution in security 
matters in Western Europe. Over time NATO’s integrated military planning system had a 
far-reaching political effect by providing security for Western Europe’s economic 
recovery and promoting reconciliation among former adversaries. This chapter also 
examines why defense planning has failed to establish balanced burden-sharing between 
the American and the European allied nations.  
 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF NATO’S DEFENSE PLANNING 
The idea of an integrated military structure and force planning process was not the 
result of the early years of the Cold War. Its roots go back to the Anglo-American 
partnership during the Second World War. In order to secure the flow of war materiel, 
equipment and ammunition across the Atlantic Ocean as well as to achieve victory over 
Nazi Germany the Americans and the British had to harmonize their military actions. 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States formed a combined command 
capable of joint operations. In spite of the deep differences in their strategic policies,15 
military doctrines and weapon systems, the three nations managed to focus on a common 
goal. Over time the Western Allies became skilled at combined planning, and the 
wartime experience provided a solid basis for NATO’s integrated military structure.16 
                                                 
15 The best known debate between the Allies was about the opening of the Second Front. According to 
Charlton’s account, “it was at Teheran that Churchill’s long-argued preference for an Anglo-American 
invasion into the Balkans, into ‘the soft underbelly of Europe’, was finally dismissed by the American 
Chiefs of Staff in favour of the Second Front in Normandy.” Michael Charlton, The Eagle and the Small 
Birds (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 39. Had Churchill’s proposal been accepted in 
1943, the post-war situation would have been different in various ways. 
16 Richard L. Kugler, Commitment to Purpose, How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 1993), pp. 20-23. 
8 
By early 1946, it became clear that the Soviets were pushing a course of 
communist imperialism. The failure of the Four Power talks in Moscow in 1947 over the 
future of Germany and Austria put an end to the collaboration of the erstwhile allied 
powers. A new threat emerged in the war-torn European continent: the Soviets were 
poised for invasion. 17 
The premature demobilization of Western Europe left the remaining forces ill-
prepared to defend against Soviet aggression. The British, French, and U.S. occupation 
forces that remained in Germany were small in number and located in areas of Germany 
that were difficult to defend in operational terms. The situation was so desperate that the 
post-war American defense plan concerning Europe called “HALFMOON,” published in 
July 1948, predicted a sweeping Soviet victory in the near future. According to the 
“HALFMOON” plan, Central Europe was indefensible. The plan envisioned a two-phase 
war: total evacuation of U.S. military forces from continental Europe in the first phase 
and a massive counterattack from the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean region 
about 12 months later in the second phase.18 
In March 1948 the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries established 
the Western Union to promote their cultural, social, economic and military ties. Article 
IV of the Brussels Treaty declared that “If any of the High Contracting Parties should be 
the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford 
the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.”19 
However, it was obvious to the Western Union’s member states that they would be 
unable to cope with a Soviet attack without American assistance. The European leaders’ 
objective was to convince the United States to support the Western Union. 
After the announcement of the Truman Doctrine on 12 March 1947 the United 
States expressed greater determination to contain the further expansion of Communism 
and to promote European recovery. The Marshall Plan (officially called the European 
                                                 
17 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone, 1994), p. 447. 
18 Kugler, Commitment to Purpose, pp. 30-38. 
19 Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, Article IV, 
Brussels, 17 March 1948. available at: http:www.weu.int/eng/docu/d480317a.htm 
9 
Recovery Program, or ERP) allocated $13 billion for economic assistance in November 
1947.20 The United States declined, however, to join the Brussels Pact. The main reason 
was well articulated in the State Department Working Group’s study in August 1948: 
“The United States could not constitutionally enter into any Treaty which would provide 
that the United States would be automatically at war as a result of an event occurring 
outside its borders or by vote of other countries without its concurrence.”21  
The North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949 contained several key 
provisions. Similar to the Brussels Treaty in some respects, the new treaty stipulated 
burden sharing (the reference to “self help and mutual aid” in Article 3) as well as 
permanent consultation obligations among the member nations (Article 4). Article 5 
provided the security guaranty, although it committed each Ally only to take 
“individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, 
including the use of armed force.”22 In this way the Treaty authorized the individual 
nations to make the final decision: any kind of response or military help “would not 
necessarily be automatic.”23 In spite of the U.S.-preferred wording of Article 5, the 
Europeans achieved their major objective: they succeeded in the entanglement of the 
United States in the security of Europe. The Treaty also gave a green light to $1.45 
billion in U.S. military aid for the new allied nations.24 
The U.S. security guarantee provided by the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 was 
mostly political in nature. The Alliance was based on America’s commitments to the 
security of its allies. Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty established a Council to 
provide a forum “to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty.”25 At 
the first Council meeting in September 1949 the Foreign Ministers of the NATO nations 
agreed to meet on an ad hoc basis “annually but convene more frequently if 
                                                 
20 Kugler, Commitment to Purpose, p. 27. 
21 Kaplan, p. 16. 
22 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 4 April 1949. Article 5. 
23 Sean Kay, p. 33. 
24 Kugler, Commitment to Purpose, p.49. 
25 The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 9 
10 
circumstances so required.”26 At the foundation NATO had neither integrated standing 
forces, nor a defense plan. In addition, it lacked the capability to mobilize against a 
Soviet attack. 27 
In accordance with Article 9 the Council established a Defence Committee, 
composed of the Allies’ defense ministers, as well as a Military Committee composed of 
the chiefs of defense and general staff. Weeks after the signature of the Washington 
Treaty the Western Union Defense Organization delegated its defense responsibilities to 
NATO and its structure merged into the fledging NATO institutions. However, it was the 
outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 that dramatically changed the situation and led 
the Allies to transform NATO into a formal political-military organization with a 
standing military command and international staff.28 
The U.S. administration was convinced that the North Korean aggression was a 
Soviet stratagem and that Moscow was also willing to use force to achieve its goals in 
Western Europe. The NSC 68 study, prepared by the State Department in early 1950, 
transformed the policy of containment into a global doctrine. The study argued that the 
Soviet Union posed an uncompromising and growing threat to the West. To contain the 
Red Army in Europe NSC 68 called for a massive military buildup, including more U.S. 
troops in Europe, integrated military planning and German rearmament. 29 
At the New York NAC meeting in September 1950 U.S. Secretary of State Dean 
G. Acheson proposed that the NATO allies establish an integrated force, consisting of 
units contributed by the NATO nations and Germany under centralized command and 
control. The NATO foreign ministers approved the plan with the exception of German 
participation. At the following meeting the Council unanimously “asked the President of 
the United States to make available General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower to serve 
                                                 
26 NATO Fact sheets: The Origins of the North Atlantic Council and the Role of Summit Meetings in 
NATO’s History available at: www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/origin.htm 
27 Kay, p. 35. 
28 Kaplan, p. 62. 
29 John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Structure (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 35. 
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as a Supreme Commander,”30 and Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery from Britain was 
appointed Deputy SACEUR. 
As the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Eisenhower had 
“the authority to train the national units assigned to his command and to organize them 
into an effective integrated defense force.”31 General Eisenhower established military 
headquarters (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, or SHAPE) for Allied 
Command Europe and appointed his wartime comrade, General Alfred Gruenther, as his 
Chief of Staff.32 Shortly afterwards the civilian International Staff was also established 
and Lord Ismay of the United Kingdom was named NATO’s first Secretary General. In 
1952 the North Atlantic Council meeting in Lisbon transformed the NAC into a 
permanent body, with permanent representatives, chaired by the Secretary General. By 
the end of 1952 the development of the fully integrated civilian and military structure 
made NATO a standing collective defense organization in peacetime without precedent 
in international history. 
 
B. MILITARY BUILDUP 
In 1948 the United States started to modify its military planning with European 
contingencies in mind. However, the integrated military planning in NATO started only 
in the summer of 1949. The new American plan called “OFFTACKLE” assumed a global 
Soviet attack: but it predicted that the Soviets would be unable to attack in strength 
everywhere at once, and that this would provide some flexibility for Alliance forces in 
Europe. The plan recognized that NATO troops might be driven back from the Rhine. 
However, unlike the HALFMOON plan, it did not project the complete evacuation of 
U.S. forces from Europe.33  
At the same time the Western Union planning staff led by General Montgomery 
put much more emphasis on defending the European mainland and called for strategic 
                                                 
30 Final Communiqué, Brussels: 18-19. December 1950. available at: www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-
95/c501219a.htm 
31 Ibid. 
32 Fact Sheet entitled “The Origin of Shape,” available at: www.shape.nato.int/History.htm 
33 Kugler, Commitment to Purpose, p. 42. 
12 
bombardment of the Soviet Union. The Brussels Pact countries adopted the so-called “as 
far forward as possible” strategy, which envisaged initial efforts to defend the Rhine and 
a military buildup that would permit moving the defense line further east in West 
Germany. Combining the American and European ideas, NATO’s MC 14/1 strategic 
guidance recognized the Alliance’s force limitations and focused on the defense of the  
Rhine, but it called for a forward defense of West Germany within the next five years. 
Although the MC 14/1 strategic guidance relied heavily on American strategic 
bombardment, including nuclear weapons, the forward defense component of the strategy 
was achievable only if NATO significantly strengthened its ground posture.34  
In this spirit at Lisbon in 1952 the North Atlantic Council took decisions 
providing for “the earliest building up of balanced collective forces to meet the 
requirements of external security.”35 The NAC endorsed “the most ambitious force goals 
of NATO’s history: 50 divisions, 4,000 aircraft, and 704 major combatant vessels in 
1952.”36 In the next two years the integrated European NATO forces were supposed to 
comprise 96 divisions, with 35 to 40 to be combat ready and the rest as reserve units, and 
9,000 aircraft. In spite of great skepticism concerning the prospects for the plan, NATO 
made considerable progress in its efforts to meet the goals. Despite the demands of their 
other national priorities, NATO nations increased their defense budgets and pursued 
ambitious rearmament programs. The 25 standing NATO divisions and the major 
investments in communication and supply facilities enabled the Alliance to strengthen its 
posture for deterrence and defense. However, the NATO military posture never met the 
objectives declared in the Lisbon agreement and remained insufficient to withstand a 
major Soviet assault. As early as 1953 the Allies concluded that the Lisbon goals were 
too ambitious and agreed to modify them. 37 
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C. THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY  
The Lisbon goals also called for the deployment of 12 West German divisions. 
The idea of establishing national military forces in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) dates back to 1948 when Pentagon officers realized that security in Europe 
required a German military contribution. As General Eisenhower stated in his first report 
as SACEUR, “there is little hope for the economical long-term attainment of security and 
stability in Europe unless West Germany can be counted on the side of the free 
nations.”38 Owing to the lack of political support from the other Allies and West German 
reluctance, it seemed to be impossible to establish West German military forces in the 
near future. By 1952, however, the situation had changed tremendously. Thanks to its 
energetic economic recovery and the creation of democratic institutions, West Germany 
was prepared to demonstrate its support for the common values of the West.  
The Pleven Plan was the next serious attempt to include the FRG in the 
transatlantic security structure after the failure of the U.S. initiative at the 1950 meeting 
of the NAC in New York. Rejecting the U.S. proposal to include German units of up to 
division strength in NATO, the French government formulated a proposal announced by 
Prime Minister René Pleven. The French plan called for the creation of a European 
Defence Community (EDC), which would have constituted an all-European military 
force containing small German units. The European army would have developed 
common equipment and infrastructures as well as its own integrated command staff, 
under SACEUR’s control.39 
The plan was embodied in the EDC Treaty in 1952. After an intense debate the 
EDC Treaty was ratified by Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. West Germany 
also ratified the treaty in 1953.40 By contrast, the emerging nationalism in France and the 
growing French military commitments overseas delayed decisions in Paris about the EDC 
Treaty. The Treaty languished until August 1954, when the French National Assembly, 
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acting on a procedural motion, chose not to debate or vote on it.41 Had the EDC plan 
been accepted, the defense component would have been an organic part of the European 
integration process from the beginning. 
The failure of the EDC led British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, with U.S. 
support, to propose a new arrangement for the FRG’s membership in NATO. The British 
plan turned back to the original American plan by abandoning the idea of a separate 
European army and by suggesting the further integration of national forces under a 
strengthened SACEUR. The London and Paris Agreements of 1954 provided for Bonn’s 
accession to both the Washington Treaty and the amended Brussels Treaty, which created 
the Western European Union (WEU). The FRG accepted many constraints on its 
conventional military forces and pledged not to produce nuclear, chemical or biological 
weapons on its soil, nor to set up a General Staff. The WEU’s main function was the 
monitoring of the constraints upon West Germany, and an arms control agency was 
created in Paris for this purpose. In order to calm French concerns about Germany’s 
potential power, the United States and the United Kingdom promised to station large 
numbers of forces in Germany as long as necessary. 42 
 
D. NUCLEAR STRATEGY 
Nuclear weapons have been integral to NATO military strategy from the outset. 
However, while MC 14/1 assumed that nuclear weapons had been incorporated into 
NATO’s defense posture, the concept relied primarily on conventional forces. The 
situation began to change in the mid-1950s as it became obvious that the European 
nations would not meet the modified Lisbon goals and that the U.S. defense budget was 
also facing cutbacks. Nuclear weapons were considered cheap and powerful, and 
therefore ideal instruments for maintaining a strong deterrence posture.43  
President Eisenhower considered nuclear weapons a partial solution for Western 
defense problems. According to President Eisenhower’s “New Look” vision, Europe 
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could be defended even with numerically inferior conventional forces backed by massive 
air attacks at the outset of the war. In a discussion with military leaders about the 
potential course of a war in 1954, the President was reported to have stated that “The 
Soviets will, however, have great trouble maintaining an offense. He indicated his firm 
intention to launch a strategic air force immediately in case of actual attack. He stressed 
that a major war will be an atomic war.”44 
The new American strategy of “Massive Retaliation” had been introduced on 
January 12, 1954, by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who said that the United 
States would obtain the “maximum deterrent at a bearable cost.” Dulles said that this 
deterrence would “depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means 
and at places of our choosing.”45 In November 1954 NATO also endorsed the concept of 
“Massive Retaliation” in its new MC-48 strategy, which predicted two phases in a 
potential future war. The initial phase would start with atomic strikes by both sides in 
efforts to achieve strategic advantage. The “subsequent phase would consist of a period 
of readjustment and follow-up leading to a conclusion of the war.”46 MC-48 declared that 
“our peacetime force pattern must be designed primarily to achieve success during this 
initial phase and emphasis must be placed upon development of the forces which can 
participate most effectively in these operations.”47 Accordingly, the nuclearization of the 
major NATO European armies, including the Bundeswehr, took place in the late 1950s. 
Although President Eisenhower’s main goal was to develop NATO Europe into 
an effective power bloc that enabled the U.S. to “sit back and relax somewhat,”48 the 
nuclearization of the NATO European military forces nations had the opposite effect. 
Owing to reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the readiness of the NATO European 
conventional forces tended to stagnate during the 1960s and 1970s. According to the 
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Subcommittee on NATO Standardization, Interoperability and Readiness (U.S. House of 
Representatives) report in 1979, “The European shortages of ammunition and 
replacement stocks are critical; evidence available to the subcommittee suggests that 
European forces will begin to run out of equipment and ammunition in a matter of days 
rather than weeks or months.”49  
In an article in 1982 NATO’s SACEUR, General Bernard W. Rogers, used a 
much more moderate tone. The SACEUR draw attention to European efforts by saying 
that “in the 1970s European spending for defense increased at a rate of two percent per 
year while American spending decreased by nearly that figure.”50 General Rogers placed 
more emphasis on the qualitative rather than the quantitative improvement of the allied 
troops. “We do need some increase in numbers of forces to offset Soviet military growth, 
but far more important to success is the enhancement of our ability to do better with our 
forces in being and to carry out the essential modernization of those forces.”51 However, 
the SACEUR also warned that “NATO’s continuing failure to fulfill its conventional 
needs means that we now must depend upon the use of theater nuclear weapons to 
accomplish our missions of deterrence and defense.”52 
 
E. WHAT WENT WRONG? 
In the early 1980s Thomas A. Callaghan asserted that NATO had never become a 
collective force as originally intended. The failure of the EDC in 1954 prevented the 
Europeans from establishing an effective European army, while the doctrine of massive 
nuclear retaliation assigned conventional forces a secondary role. Callaghan argued that 
the Allies were spending the bulk of their military budgets (at that time $150 billion per 
year) mainly on national (as opposed to collective) defense. “As a consequence,” he 
stated, “NATO’s Integrated Military Command today commands almost nothing that is 
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integrated: neither its tactical doctrine for the defense of Europe; nor its military 
equipment requirements; nor its weaponry, its ammunition, its repair parts; nor its war 
reserve ‘days of supply’; nor its logistics, its communications, its maintenance, or 
operational training.”53 
Notwithstanding the merits of Callaghan’s argument, it should be noted that 
defense planning has a political role. Planners in NATO’s integrated military system 
developed a sophisticated force planning mechanism, primarily in order to coordinate the 
national defense plans and thereby enable the Alliance to meet its political goals. The 
integrated system harmonized national and collective defense planning, encouraged 
interoperability among forces, and promoted efficiency in multilateral military 
operations. Over time, defense planning became a core function of NATO and had a far-
reaching practical effect on the evolution of Allied military postures. NATO’s 
multilateral planning process, based on transparency and consultation among the 
members, enabled the Western European allies to focus on economic recovery and to 
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III. NATO’S ESDI AND THE EUROPEAN UNION’S ESDP 
Chapter III examines the evolution of institutional arrangements related to 
transatlantic security relations during the immediate post-Cold War period. At the 
beginning of the 1990s the European Union expressed an aspiration to play a larger role 
in security and defense matters and adopted in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union 
the principle of pursuing a Common Foreign and Security Policy, not excluding the 
development of common defense policies and even, in the long term, a common defense. 
Although NATO has remained the dominant framework in European security matters, the 
period has been marked by repeated efforts by the EU member nations and the NATO 
European allies to enhance their role.  This process started with the revitalization of the 
WEU in 1991, which was portrayed as a European pillar within NATO by 1996. Since 
late 1998 the focus has shifted to the pursuit of autonomous EU military capabilities. The 
chapter also considers the major national positions concerning these issues. 
 
A. FROM ESDI TO ESDP 
Despite a series of conventional force improvement efforts, including the Long –
Term Defence Program (LTDP) in the late 1970s and the Conventional Defence 
Improvement (CDI)) initiative in the early 1980s, the capability gap between the 
European and American forces has continued to grow. 55 The collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 promoted perceptions of decreased 
collective defense threats in NATO Europe.  
However, the permanent tension in the Balkans in the 1990s had a dual effect on 
the European Union. The EU leaders realized that they ought to harmonize their foreign 
policies and that an effective military force would be required to support a common 
policy. In the absence of a common policy the EU failed to cope effectively with limited 
conflicts on its periphery. This realization led to the establishment of the Common 
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Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second pillar of the Treaty on European 
Union, which entered into force in November 1993.  
The United States was prepared to support cooperation within NATO to improve 
the military capabilities of the European allies without undermining the transatlantic 
relationship. The European Security and Defense Identity (or ESDI) was intended to 
ensure that European efforts to play a greater role in international security would be 
pursued within the Alliance. NATO’s London Declaration in July 1990 mentioned for the 
first time that the Alliance was prepared to support “the development of a European 
identity in the domain of security.”56 However, the ESDI concept lacked an effective 
institutional framework. In addition to the Western European Union there were (and 
remain) several bilateral and trilateral efforts among the European Allied nations. 57 
In the beginning the European efforts were focused on the revitalization of the 
Western European Union. The Petersberg Declaration in June 1992 stipulated that the 
WEU would serve “as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to 
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.”58 The Declaration also stated 
that, in addition to collective defense, “military units of WEU member States, acting 
under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; 
peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking. 59 
The NATO Summit of January 1994 in Brussels was a milestone in the history of 
the Alliance concerning the transatlantic relationship. NATO’s heads of state and 
government welcomed “the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht and the launching 
of the European Union, which will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and 
allow it to make a more coherent contribution to the security of all the Allies.”60 NATO 
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leaders also gave their support to the development of the European Security and Defense 
Identity and to the strengthening of the WEU. In order to deepen further the cooperation 
between NATO and the WEU, NATO leaders declared their readiness “to make 
collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North 
Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of 
their Common Foreign and Security Policy.”61 
The declaration also introduced the noteworthy “separable but not separate”62 
formula in NATO and endorsed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) “as a 
means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating 
nations outside the Alliance.”63 The CJTF concept was linked to another project launched 
at the Summit, the Partnership for Peace (PfP). As a result, the CJTF concept was 
intended not only to support WEU operations but also to enable PfP countries to take part 
in non-Article 5 operations.  
According to a NATO fact sheet, “a Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) is a 
multinational, multi-service deployable task force generated and tailored primarily, but 
not exclusively, for military operations not involving the defence of Alliance territory, 
such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping.”64 The CJTF concept played an important 
role in NATO peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. The concept enabled eighteen 
non-NATO countries to participate in the Alliance peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, first 
as part of the Implementation Force (IFOR), beginning in December 1995, and a year 
later in the Stabilization Force (SFOR).65 
In June 1996, at the NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin, the allies took a further 
step in the process of enhancing WEU-NATO relations by making NATO assets 
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available for NAC-approved WEU operations. The Berlin communiqué declares, that 
NATO’s 
 third objective is the development of the European Security and Defence 
Identity within the Alliance. Taking full advantage of the approved CJTF 
concept, this identity will be grounded on sound military principles and 
supported by appropriate military planning and permit the creation of 
militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the 
political control and strategic direction of the WEU.  
As an essential element of the development of this identity, we will 
prepare, with the involvement of NATO and the WEU, for WEU-led 
operations (including planning and exercising of command elements and 
forces). Such preparations within the Alliance should take into account the 
participation, including in European command arrangements, of all 
European Allies if they were so to choose. It will be based on:  
· identification, within the Alliance, of the types of separable but not 
separate capabilities, assets and support assets, as well as, in order 
to prepare for WEU-led operations, separable but not separate 
HQs, HQ elements and command positions, that would be required 
to command and conduct WEU-led operations and which could be 
made available, subject to decision by the NAC;  
· elaboration of appropriate multinational European command 
arrangements within NATO, consistent with and taking full 
advantage of the CJTF concept, able to prepare, support, command 
and conduct the WEU-led operations. This implies double-hatting 
appropriate personnel within the NATO command structure to 
perform these functions. Such European command arrangements 
should be identifiable and the arrangements should be sufficiently 
well articulated to permit the rapid constitution of a militarily 
coherent and effective operational force.66 
 
The communiqué reflected, among other factors, an agreement between the 
United States and France. Concerning the mechanism for force planning of the fledgling 
WEU-based ESDI, France argued for a separate command structure for non-Article 5 
missions while the United States insisted on keeping these missions within the NATO 
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structure. In the absence of support from other Allies France (at least for the time being) 
acknowledged that the ESDI would be developed within NATO. In return the United 
States accepted the possibility that NATO assets could be used in WEU-led operations.67 
The agreement also envisaged France’s reintegration to NATO’s military 
command structure. However, France made this reintegration conditional on European 
command of the Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) headquarters in Naples. 
This French proposal was unacceptable to Washington and other Allied capitals, partly 
because it violated the principle that command responsibilities should reflect force 
contributions.68  
After having chosen in 1997 not to fully return to NATO’s integrated military 
structure, France turned towards the EU, which “offered by far the best chance of 
securing full-hearted French participation.”69 The time had arrived much earlier than 
France expected for the EU to play a more significant role in European security affairs, 
with reduced dependence on the United States. 
In December 1998 Prime Minister Tony Blair broke with the traditional British 
policy, which considered NATO the predominant forum in European security issues. 
When the British Prime Minister “crossed the European defence Rubicon” at the Franco-
British summit in St. Malo, it set the entire ESDP into motion. 70 The reasons behind this 
dramatic change in the United Kingdom’s policy on EU defense matters are complex and 
manifold. Certainly there was an interest in providing the UK a more significant role in 
EU affairs. Franco-German domination in European Union affairs gained a new impetus 
with the introduction of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU, or the euro) as well as 
through the implementation of the Schengen regime. More active British participation 
concerning the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy was intended to compensate 
for Britain’s non-participation in the EMU and the Schengen Agreements.71 The Blair 
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government also came to the conclusion that “in the twenty-first century, there is no need 
to make a definite choice between being European and at the same time being the closest 
ally of the Americans. On the contrary, the best ally of the United states can only be a 
genuine European.”72 
At the April 1999 Washington Summit, NATO recognized the EU’s decision to 
develop its own security and defense policy. The communiqué states “that a stronger 
European role will help contribute to the  vitality of our Alliance for the 21st century.”73 
At the same meeting, the Allies also launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) in 
order to “improve the defence capabilities of the Alliance to ensure the effectiveness of 
the future multinational operations across the full spectrum of the Alliance missions in 
the present and foreseeable security environment.”74  
In short, the shift in both American and British policies toward a more 
autonomous EU defense policy converged with the long-standing French determination 
to develop an ESDP. As a result, since late 1998 the focus of attention has been 
transferred from the ESDI (with its emphasis on more European capability within NATO) 
to the ESDP, which aims at developing autonomous EU capabilities, albeit with 
continued cooperation with NATO.75  
 
B. NATIONAL POSITIONS 
Concerning the mechanism for ESDP defense planning, the European Union 
considered two major options: to accept NATO’s offer to participate in the alliance’s 
well-established force planning process or to create a separate process within the EU. 
These possibilities divided the NATO countries into two groups. For different reasons, 
both France and Turkey initially rejected the principle of a consolidated NATO-EU force 
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planning process. The rest of the allies, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, 
felt it necessary to have close NATO-EU cooperation. 
France considered the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) an 
excellent opportunity to exert leadership in the sphere of security and defense. France’s 
“self- imposed isolation” in NATO would not change. However, some of the French 
believed that building an ESDP would create a necessary counter-balance to America’s 
“hegemonic” role in NATO. Consequently France has championed the establishment of 
an independent EU force planning mechanism, which is not dependent on NATO’s 
planning arrangements. The French have nonetheless wanted to maintain coordination 
with NATO based on information exchanges and technical expertise.  
Turkey had also rejected the EU’s proposed format of cooperation for non –
European NATO members with respect to the use of NATO assets. Turkish foreign 
policy is heavily loaded with frustration over Ankara’s relationship with the EU. It must 
be kept in mind that before “an accession partnership” was drawn up in Helsinki in 1999, 
the EU refused to accept Turkey to be considered a future member of and to enter 
accession negotiations with the European Union. Its close association with the United 
States the possession of the la rgest armed forces among the European NATO allies, the 
second largest in NATO and its geo-strategic location make Turkey an important player 
that must be given due consideration. Especially in view of the country’s geographical 
proximity to existing and potential crisis areas, Turkey threatened to use its “veto 
power”76 in NATO to block the EU’s access to NATO assets unless direct influence on 
all EU decision-making concerning matters affecting its security interests was 
guaranteed. According to an official Turkish statement, “We intend to continue and to 
strengthen our involvement in future EU-led crisis management efforts. Our contributions 
are based on full participation in the decision process as well as in the preparation and 
planning of EU-led operations.77 
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The other group, led by Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, has 
supported strong links between NATO and EU planning and substantial consultation. 
Taking the lead together with France on ESDP development, the UK sought influence 
over the direction of the process. The British government carefully weighed this move 
against its responsibilities within the context of Britain’s “special relationship” with the 
United States. In fact, as Jolyon Howorth argues, the British decision to end a fifty-year-
old veto on European defense integration “did not represent a British ‘conversion’ to the 
European cause – to the extent to which, for the United Kingdom, the starting point was a 
pragmatic attempt to preserve the Atlantic Alliance. If that meant constructing a 
European instrument (CESDP), then so be it.”78 Tony Blair, “anxious to carve out some 
European role for the United Kingdom,” 79 chose to change UK policy on ESDP. This 
policy nonetheless remained Atlanticist at heart.  
The United States has sought  to avoid arrangements that could weaken NATO 
and favors strong co-ordination between NATO and the EU. Ever since the French-
British agreement at St. Malo to pursue long latent European Union intentions in the field 
of security and defense the signals coming from Washington have been clear and 
specific. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright formally declared the U.S. 
Administration’s support but cautioned the Europeans against “the Three Ds: decoupling, 
duplication, and discrimination.”80 The “three Ds” have summarized American concerns 
pertaining to the development of an autonomous European Union defense capacity. 
The new U.S. Administration of President George W. Bush will have to deal with 
the ESDP as it enters its more practical stage. It will have to decide whether it will 
continue the rather conditional United States support so far and encourage a stronger and 
more capable European Union to take its place in the security and defense arena. So far 
the statements made by both the president and the members of his administration show a 
tendency to ask the European allies to accept greater responsibilities and hence a greater 
share of the burden. During the 2000 presidential campaign it was reported that “a 
                                                 
78 Howorth, European Integration and Defence, p. 29. 
79 Ibid., p. 25. 
80 Madeleine K. Albright, “The Right Balance Will Secure NATO’s Future,” Financial Times, 7 
December 1998. 
27 
proposal by George W. Bush …to remove US troops from peacekeeping missions in the 
Balkans has provoked a wave of anxiety among the European allies, who fear such a 
move would split the NATO alliance and damage faith in American leadership.”81  
Such a reaction on the part of the Europeans is at first blush hard to understand. If 
the European Union’s intentions regarding ESDP were serious and far-reaching, a U.S. 
step in that direction would have been perceived as an opportunity to act. Since this has 
not been the case, one is inevitably tempted to suspect that the loudly proclaimed 
consensus on the ESDP’s development and purposes is fragile and perhaps even non-
existent.  
It should be noted that, although President Bush assured the European allies in 
July 2001 that the United States would not unilaterally withdraw its forces from the 
Balkans, the 11 September 2001 attacks on America may result in further reductions in 
the U.S. forces in the region. 82 In other words, challenges for the EU’s ESDP may arise 
more promptly than anticipated when key decisions were made in 1999. 
The long deadlock between the EU and Turkey seemed to be cleared away in 
early December 2001, when Turkey came to terms with the United Kingdom and the 
United States. According to the agreement, “As a NATO ally and a candidate for 
European Union membership, Turkey supports the ESDP process.”83 In return, the 
“Ankara document” enabled Turkey to have a direct voice in the EU’s decision-making 
process regarding ESDP matters in Turkey’s vicinity and offered a right of Turkish 
participation in EU military operations.84 Turkey also had obtained a guarantee that the 
EU would not intervene in Cyprus or Aegean issues. As the Turkish Prime Minister, 
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Bulent Ecevit, told reporters, “Turkey’s expectations have been largely met.”85 In spite of 
the Ankara document the long debate between the EU and Turkey is far from settled. 
Greece blocked the “Ankara document” agreement at the EU summit in Laeken, in 
December 2001, “saying it objected to assurances given to NATO member Turkey that 
the EU would not involve itself in possible disputes between two NATO countries.”86 
Athens also rejects the principle of deep Turkish involvement in the EU’s ESDP and 
asserts that “the EU must retain ‘autonomy’ regarding issues of foreign policy and 
defence.”87  
The terrorist attacks in September 2001 against the United States have also had a 
tremendous effect on the future of the ESDP. According to Maartje Rutten, a Dutch 
analyst, “Not only does it largely de-rail the ESDP plans (strategy, goals, geographic 
limits and character of possible operations, military and civil means, etc) but international 
anti-terrorism coalition-building and the military campaign in Afghanistan have put ‘EU 
commonality’ under significant strain, putting the CFSP/ESDP acquis in danger.”88 
At the informal ministerial meeting in October 2001 the European Union defense 
ministers refused to endorse the proposal to increase national spending on the ESDP as a 
response to the terrorist attacks in America.89 Moreover, the enthusiastic announcement 
by Louis Michel, the Belgian foreign minister, at the EU summit in Laeken, that the EU’s 
peacekeeping force in Afghanistan would be “a turning point in the history of the union” 
has been rejected by many EU observers. Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister, 
was quoted as saying that, ”Even if we wanted to, we could not do it as we are not as far 
as we need to be with the [defence] structures.”90 By contrast, the terrorist attacks 
impelled an extraordinary $50 billion increase in the U.S. defense budget, which may 
easily further widen the already significant military gap between the European and 
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American forces. As a former German defense official noted, “At this rate, we won’t be 
able to communicate with you, much less fight alongside you.”91  
Additionally, the war on terror might stimulate tendencies toward unilateralism in 
the United States. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reaffirmed the official 
view of the Bush administration in his January 2002 speech at the National Defense 
University: ”[W]ars can benefit from coalitions of the willing, to be sure. But they should 
not be fought by committee. The mission must determine the coalition, and the coalition 
must not determine the mission. If it does, the mission will be dumbed down to the lowest 
common denominator, and we can’t afford that.”92 The growing capability gap between 
the EU and the United States, amplified by a stronger American inclination to take action 
unilaterally, could jeopardize the transatlantic relationship.  
In spite of the Turkey-Greece debate and the U.S. war on terrorism, the future of 
the ESDP mainly depends on the United Kingdom and France, the two driving forces of 
the process. It is too early to conclude that the United Kingdom has given up its 
Atlanticist convictions for the European Union or that this trend in British policy will 
remain unaltered both in direction and strength. France, on the other hand, will try to 
make the most of ESDP by playing the leading role it has long sought. “Between the 
French maximalist quest for ‘autonomy’ and the UK reliance on NATO for strategic 
assets, there is currently a gulf which words alone are unlikely to be able to continue to 
bridge,” notes Howorth. 93 
 
C. NON-EU NATO MEMBERS 
The political debate over the EU defense planning process in formation may be 
even more arduous than the technical one because it could create numerous splits among 
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the participating countries. According to Kori Schake, “The idea of a caucus of member 
states within NATO could be detrimental both to the Alliance and European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP). It would position the United States, Turkey, Norway, Canada, 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and possibly Denmark on one side of the table to 
review a position agreed upon by the European Union.”94  
The roots of the problem with regard to the participation of non-EU member 
countries go back to the WEU. The WEU used to possess a relatively loose membership 
system with four categories. The ten full members (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom) granted 
associate membership to the six non-EU NATO European countries (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey) and observer status was extended to the 
four EU countries (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) which were not NATO 
members and Denmark (a NATO ally that preferred observer status). Associate 
partnership was offered to the aspirant countries. In practice, the meetings were open and 
every country had an opportunity to express its position on the agenda. The various types 
of status became practically almost insignificant as countries were treated equally in 
general matters.95  
The EU’s decision to pursue the ESDP and to incorporate certain functions of the 
WEU, effectively abolishing the WEU as an institution, put an end to this arrangement. 
The ESDP places tremendous emphasis on the EU’s autonomous decision making, and 
this implies rejecting any kind of political influence from outside the European Union. As 
a result the non-EU NATO European member nations feel that they are excluded from 
the decision making process. This type of caucus could jeopardize the coherence of the 
Alliance, and this risk prompted the United States to take a position against 
discrimination toward the non-EU NATO European nations. 
The EU holds that undue discrimination is avoided by the decision of the 
European Council at Helsinki in December 1999. The EU pledged to pursue “necessary 
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dialogue, consultation and co-operation with NATO and its non-EU members, other 
countries who are candidates for accession to the EU as well as other prospective partners 
in EU-led crisis management, with full respect for the decision-making autonomy of the 
EU and the single institutional framework of the Union.”96  
In order to fulfill this commitment, the EU offered an opportunity to non-EU 
NATO European members to participate in the ESDP project in the Helsinki and Feira 
documents. This provision keeps the ESDP open for their contributions of resources 
necessary for the Petersberg tasks and provides the possibility of regular and substantive 
dialogue on ESDP issues. In non-crisis periods that dialogue will be maintained through 
regular meetings in an “EU+6” format on ESDP matters and their possible implications 
for non-EU NATO countries. (As noted earlier, the six non-EU NATO European nations 
are the following: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey.) 
These consultative meetings will be held twice a year, with schedules and agendas 
determined by the European Council. In times of crisis, the EU will intensify these 
consultations. If a military operation is considered (especially with use of NATO assets), 
the European Council will inform “the six” about its intentions and military options, and 
take into consideration their security concerns before reaching a final decision. Once the 
European Council decides on a military operation, it will present operative planning work 
to “the six,” and invite them to join the operation. Each member of “the six” will decide 
whether to join the operation. In contrast, if the operation is conducted without NATO 
assets the six non-EU European NATO members may only participate upon invitation by 
the European Council. In each case, the Council will make the final decision on whether 
and how a military operation will take place.97 
The Nice Summit approved the Feira decisions concerning the participation of the 
non-EU European NATO countries in the ESDP in Annex VI to Annex VI of the 
Presidency Conclusions. This annex is entitled “Arrangements Concerning non-EU 
European NATO Members and Other Countries which are Candidates for Accession to 
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the EU.”98 According to the document, a permanent consultation mechanism will be 
established during non-crisis periods in an EU+15 format (all the 15 candidate countries, 
including “the six”) and in an EU+6 format, with a minimum of two meetings in every 
six month Presidency. Concerning crisis periods the document recognizes two phases: a 
pre-operational phase, and an operational phase.99 According to the document, “For 
operations requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, operational planning will 
be carried out by the Alliance’s planning bodies, and for an autonomous EU operation it 
will be carried out within one of the European strategic level headquarters.”100 In the first 
case, the non-EU European allies would be involved in the strategic planning from the 
beginning according to NATO procedures. By contrast, “Once the Council has chosen the 
strategic military option(s), the operational planning work will be presented to the non-
EU European NATO members and the other candidate countries which have expressed 
their intention in principle of taking part in the operation, to enable them to determine the 
nature and volume of the contribution they could make to an EU-led operation.”101  
In summary, the EU-led operation not only puts the non-EU European NATO 
members and the other candidate countries in the same category, but is based on the “full 
respect for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and its single institutional 
framework”102 It therefore excludes them from the EU’s strategic planning. The new 
situation is obviously less than fully satisfying for the non-EU European NATO 
countries.103 Turkey in particular has expressed concerns that the EU might plan 
operations “to areas which Turkey regarded as touching upon its security interests”104 
without Turkish participation from the beginning. 
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The Nice decisions also ignored the American view that “the six non-EU 
European Allies should be invited to participate, to the widest possible extent, in EU 
preparations to meet its Headline Goal and to consult closely with EU members before an 
EU decision on a military operation.”105 Secretary of Defense Cohen put it very baldly in 
the same speech in Birmingham: “once EU members have decided to conduct an 
operation, non-EU European Allies willing to contribute to the operation understandably 
should participate in decision-shaping on implementation of that operation – not unlike 
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IV. EU-NATO DEFENSE PLANNING 
 
Defense planning – a complicated activity with both technical and political 
dimensions – may influence the future of the transatlantic rela tionship. NATO defense 
planning, based on the integrated military structure, helps to enable the Allies to conduct 
operations as a coalition. The joint NATO-EU planning process could in principle build a 
common understanding among the member nations about using force and avoid 
unnecessary duplications that could waste resources and even, in some circumstances, 
undermine the transatlantic relationship. However, such a process could also lead to 
competition and dissonance between the two organizations if the EU developed different 
ways to utilize the same forces.107 
 
A. NEW EU STRUCTURE 
In order to have autonomous European Union capabilities and to build a 
relationship of equality with NATO, the EU first had to set up its own permanent political 
and military structure dealing with security and defense policy. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam, which was formulated in 1997 and entered into force in 1999, incorporated 
specific policies of the Western European Union (WEU) into the Treaty on European 
Union, established the position of a high representative for the CFSP, and provided a 
legal basis for the EU to conduct “Petersberg tasks”-type military actions.108 
In June 1999, former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana was selected to 
serve in the new position of High Representative of the CFSP (HR-CFSP), which also 
combines two other functions. Solana is Secretary General of the European Council and 
in the fall of 1999 he was also named the new Secretary General of the WEU. “The 
Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and 
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security policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the 
common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the 
formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate 
and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting 
political dialogue with third parties.”109 A Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit 
(Policy Unit or PPEWU) has also been established to support the HR-CSFP and his/her 
cabinet.110 
The Nice Summit in December 2000 endorsed the recommendations of the 
European Council in Helsinki concerning the permanent political and military structure 
of the European Union. At Nice the European Council decided to establish the Political 
and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (EUMC), and the Military Staff 
(EUMS) of the European Union. 111 Each of these new structures contains representation 
from every EU nation, and every decision requires consensus.  
The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is a senior level body of the national 
representatives. The PSC deals with “all aspects of the CFSP, including the CESDP,” and 
exercises political control and strategic direction over EU operations. It is also 
responsible for implementing decisions of the European Council. The European Union 
Military Committee (EUMC) consists of the Chiefs of Defense Staff, who are for day-to-
day activities represented by their military delegates. The EUMC provides military 
advice, makes recommendations to the PSC, and serves as an interface between the 
civilian PSC and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS).112 
The EUMS is the operational military headquarters of the European Council and 
consists of five divisions: (1) Policy and Plans, (2) Intelligence, (3) Operations and 
Exercises, (4) Logistics and Resources, and (5) Communications and Information 
Systems. The EU Military Staff is also responsible for three major operational functions: 
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early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning. Concerning strategic 
planning “it carries out the military aspects of strategic advance planning for Petersberg 
missions.” 113 It contributes to the development and preparation of national and 
multinational forces made available by the Member States to the EU.114  
However, the EUMS is not expected to conduct operational planning. According 
to a British Ministry of Defense statement, “[I]n most circumstances, we expect to use the 
existing multinational operational capabilities of NATO for this purpose. There is no 
intention to create a separate EU planning headquarters to duplicate this capability.”115 
According to Colin Robinson, “The model for the EUMS is the NATO International 
Military Staff, which supports the NATO Military Committee, rather than SHAPE, the 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, an operational military headquarters.”116 
Despite the efforts to create a single center for politico-military planning, analysis 
and policy advice, there are still “unresolved tensions” within the new EU structure. 
Chris Patten, the Commissioner for External Relations of the European Commission, 
voiced his concern that the creation of the HR-CFSP further complicated the EU’s 
foreign policy. In response, the European Commission gave its backing to Patten’s 
demand for a “bigger role” for the European Commission in foreign policy. 117 This led to 
“a cooling of relations between Patten and Solana.” Similarly, a “turf battle” emerged 
between the PSC and the COREPER (the Committee of Permanent Representatives, 
which consists the permanent representatives, or ambassadors of the member states of the 
EU in Brussels) on the PSC’s role in the non-military aspects of crisis management.118 In 
spite of this EU “domestic quarrel,” the new structure enabled the EU to conduct 
negotia tions with NATO. 
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B. THE EU’S INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO 
The relationship between NATO and the EU is clearly in its early stages. In order 
to settle the technical questions in April 1999 the NATO heads of state and government 
meeting in Washington, less than two months before the European Council meeting in 
Cologne (3-4 June 1999), offered close military planning cooperation: 
…we therefore stand ready to define and adopt the necessary 
arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective 
assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance 
as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance. The Council in 
Permanent Session will approve these arrangements, which will respect 
the requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command 
structure, and should address: 
Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to 
military planning for EU-led operations; 
The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-defined NATO 
capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations; 
Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led 
operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to 
assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities; 
The further adaptation of NATO’s defence planning system to incorporate 
more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations. 119 
In response to the NATO offer the Presidency Report on ESDP recognized 
NATO’s primary role in collective defense and called for “a genuine strategic partnership 
between the EU and NATO in the management of crises with due regard for the two 
organizations’ decision-making autonomy.”120 The Report also declared that the EU 
would place significant emphasis on consultation, cooperation and transparency within 
the EU-NATO relationship. Therefore the EU proposed further cooperation with NATO 
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under Annex VII to Annex VI of the Presidency Report, labeled “Standing Arrangements 
for Consultation and Cooperation Between the EU and NATO.”121 
The general principles for the relationship are set forth in the Appendix to Annex 
VII to Annex VI, entitled “Annex to the Permanent Arrangements on EU/NATO 
Consultation and Cooperation on the Implementation of Paragraph 10 of the Washington 
Communiqué,” in which the European Union summarized the relevant proposals in three 
points. First, the EU seeks “guaranteed permanent access to NATO’s planning 
capabilities,” including operational planning.122 “Two different kinds of access are at 
issue: first, continuous access, whether before or during crisis, to NATO planning 
capabilities; second, the actual use of executive assets –headquarters, infrastructure, 
communications and the like – in operations.”123 The access would be guaranteed 
through the DSACEUR, who is in charge of managing priorities and allocating assets for 
operations conducted by (or in cooperation with) the EU. 124 However, it should be noted 
that the document stipulates the following conditions: 
in the event of DSACEUR’s informing the EU that he cannot at the same 
time satisfy both the EU request and NATO work on a non-Article V 
operation, close consultation will take place between the organizations at 
the appropriate level in order that an acceptable solution for the two 
organisations in terms of managing priorities and allocating assets may be 
reached, the final decision lying with NATO; 
should NATO undertake an Article V operation and should it have had to 
refuse or recall planning capabilities in that context, the EU will have 
access to those NATO planning capabilities which remain available.125 
In the second point, the EU suggests that the PSC/NAC draw up an overall 
package of “ the pre-identified assets and capabilities which are likely to be used”126 in a 
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specific EU-led operation. Such a list is vital because it is not clear from the text whether 
these are NATO assets funded by the Alliance’s common infrastructure budgets (such as 
pipelines, airfields, radars, and communications equipment) or U.S. capabilities made 
available to NATO.127 In order to avoid unnecessary duplication and transatlantic discord 
it must be clarified which are the U.S. capabilities that the EU can rely on. 128 
According to the third point in the EU’s proposal, “Discussions will take place 
between experts from the EU and the Alliance with a view to identifying a series of 
possible options for the choice of all or part of a chain of command (operation 
commanders, force commanders, unit commanders and associated Military Staff 
elements).”129 To promote transparency and consultation, regular dialogue will be 
established between the EU’s Political and Security Committee and the North Atlantic 
Council, as well as between the Military Committees and subsidiary groups of the two 
organizations. Additional meetings may also be requested.130 
Through joint meetings of the NAC and PSC, exchanges of views, and 
agreements on the use of assets and infrastructure, the two organizations are attempting to 
complement each other. In September 2000, the NAC and the PSC met for the first time. 
Three NAC-PSC meetings will take place during each six-month EU Presidency. In 
addition, two foreign ministerial meetings will take place during this period.131  
France wanted to hold an EU meeting prior to any EU-NATO consultations while 
the UK and other EU nations insisted on cont inuous close cooperation with NATO. 
Under increasing pressure the French gave in and agreed to adopt the plan setting up four 
EU-NATO working groups.132 As a result the EU and NATO have established four ad 
hoc working groups for four specific areas: 1) developing a permanent relationship for 
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consultation and cooperation; 2) exploring the ability to exchange classified information 
(this task has been completed); 3) devising practical arrangements to allow the EU access 
to NATO assets and capabilities; and 4) discussing capability goals and how to integrate 
EU operations into NATO planning with coherence and transparency. 133 
 
C. DEFENSE PLANNING IN THE EU 
Defense planning has two basic aspects. The main objective of the “strategic 
planning” is to set the military goals and prepare the individual country or the coalition as 
a whole to deal with the possibility of future crises. In the case of NATO-EU cooperation 
strategic planning is supposed to provide transparency and help to avoid unnecessary 
duplication between the two organizations. “Operational planning,” as its name implies, 
means the process of getting ready to conduct military actions.134 
François Heisbourg suggests that the “EU should limit itself to strategic planning 
and generic requirements.”135 He notes tha t NATO strategic planning failed to foresee 
the security challenges of the 1990s and argues that the adaptation to the new conditions 
in Europe was more the result of national than collective NATO measures. In 
consequence, he maintains, the European Union’s planners should focus on strategic 
planning and allow the Alliance to do the force planning, which NATO does 
effectively. 136 
 
1. Military Strategic Planning Outside Times of Crisis 
The EU has in fact decided to focus primarily on conducting strategic planning. A 
preliminary definition of the Strategic Planning is included in Annex V to Annex VI of 
the Nice European Council Presidency Report on the ESDP under the “Role and Tasks” 
of the EUMS. According to the preliminary definition, strategic planning consists of 
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“planning activities that start as soon as a crisis emerges and end when the EU political 
authorities approve a military strategic option or a set of military strategic options. The 
strategic process encompasses military situation assessment, definitions of a POL/MIL 
framework and development of military strategic options.”137  
In the EU structure it will be the Military Staff’s responsibility to deal with 
military strategic planning under the supervision of the Military Committee. This will 
oblige the EUMS to undertake two complementary functions: advance military strategic 
planning and crisis military strategic planning. The main objective of the advance 
military strategic planning is to prepare the EU in peacetime to deal with the possibility 
of future crises. To provide transparency and avoid unnecessary duplications between the 
EU and NATO it will be conducted in close consultation and cooperation between EUMS 
and NATO’s International Military Staff (IMS).138 However, neither the EU Military 
Committee (EUMC) nor the EU Military Staff is responsible for contingency planning 
for military operations or operational command. This responsibility belongs to the staff of 
Allied Command Europe, under the DSACEUR. 139 
 
2. Military Strategic Planning in Times of Crisis 
When a crisis emerges, “the PSC is the Council body which deals with crisis 
situations and examines all the options that might be considered as the Union’s response 
within the single institutional framework and without prejudice to the decision-making 
and implementation procedures of each pillar.”140 In order to prepare the EU’s response 
to a crisis the PSC issues an Initiating Directive to the Director General of the EUMS 
(DGEUMS) to draw up, prioritize and present military options. The role of the directive 
is to translate the PSC’s request into military terms. In response the EUMS elaborates the 
military strategic options and supports the EUMC to finalize the Initial Planning 
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Guidance and Planning Directives forwarded to the PSC.141 Based upon the 
EUMS/EUMC evaluation, the PSC sends its recommendations to the Council, which 
decides to launch the operation. 142  
The EU and NATO intend independently to follow developments with crisis and 
conflict potential and to maintain a regular dialogue, primarily between the PSC and the 
NAC. In the emergency phase of a crisis the contacts and meetings are to be intensified 
as the EU and NATO exchange intelligence and other relevant information related to the 
crisis in accordance with the NATO-EU Security Agreement.143 EU and NATO members 
will consult and decide which organization will take care of the crisis. If NATO decides 
that the Alliance as a whole will not be engaged militarily, the EU will have the right to 
undertake a crisis response operation. 144  
In the next step the EU will decide whether it will conduct the operation with or 
without NATO support. If it is decided that the EU will call for NATO assets and 
capabilities, the PSC will inform the NAC and experts from the two organizations will 
meet to specify the required NATO assets. When EU and Alliance experts agree on a list 
of the required NATO assets and capabilities, the EU will forward the request to NATO’s 
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR). The DSACEUR, who is 
traditionally a European, will take the lead in military planning at SHAPE and will report 
to both NATO and EU leaders, but will take orders only from the EU during EU-led, 
NATO-supported operations.145  
If an EU operation is conducted without NATO assets and capabilities, a lead 
nation will be selected to develop plans and provide command and control. According to 
the British Ministry of Defense, “operational planning would be carried out at a National 
Headquarters, for example the Permanent Joint Headquarters in the UK or Creil in 
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France.”146 In this case, the “non-EU European [NATO] allies may send liaison officers 
to the European Military Staff bodies at strategic level for exchanges of information on 
operational planning and the contributions envisaged.“147 Even so, the Alliance and the 
EU continue to meet on a regular basis so that they can discuss their assessments of the 
evolution of the crisis.  
The implications regarding the EU’s role in operational planning have raised 
some concerns in NATO. In a recent RAND study, Robert E. Hunter says that “For the 
United States (and other concerned about the coherence of NATO and its relations with 
the EU/ESDP), the operational planning functions were clearly to be contingent on the 
type of operation being undertaken.”148 Hunter also offers a consistent argument from the 
Alliance’s point of view: 
From NATO’s point of view, the process was backwards: It should be 
joint planning first, then deciding who would undertake an operation 
(NATO or the European Union), then considering whether NATO assets 
would be needed and hence transferred, and then undertaking any 
subsequent planning – but again, from NATO’s point of view, not done by 
any body not fully, regularly, and consistently “transparent” to NATO 
planners and procedures. To put the point even more directly: This issue 
of the locus of planning could create a serious impediment to making 
decisions on the basis of the agreed principle of “where NATO as a whole 
is not engaged.” That bridge could not be crossed until NATO had a 
chance to review a situation, plan for it, and then judge whether it would 
or would not be engaged; the ESDP proposal for a bifurcated planning 
system presupposed that the “NATO engaged” issue had been decided 
even before the locus for planning could be agreed upon. 149 
In addition to the lack of transparency, Hunter pointed out that there was no 
reciprocal right offered to NATO with regard to EU planning at any level. As a result, he 
predicts that the EU proposal will prove problematic because “no serious military 
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strategist or planner could endorse such a set of procedures for two institutions that 
sought to be able to work together.”150 
 
 
3. Force Planning  
At the Helsinki summit in December 1999, the European Union agreed to adopt 
the Headline Goal, which declared that “Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy 
within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50, 000-60,000 
persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks,”151 The EU agreed that “[t]hese 
forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and 
intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as 
appropriate, air and naval elements.”152  
In contrast with their approach to some EU activities, the EU states are pursuing 
the ESDP on an intergovernmental basis. Consequently, authority over the use of military 
force is retained by the individual countries. The ESDP process “does not involve the 
establishment of a European army”153 or even a standing European Rapid Reaction 
Force. The troops declared relevant to the headline goal “would remain in their peacetime 
deployments and under national command.”154  
Another common misunderstanding concerning the forces needs to be clarified. 
The troops declared available for the ESDP are existing ones, not newly established units; 
and there was no suggestion that these units would be separated from the ones declared to 
NATO. The European Union countries had no extra forces, and some of them had already 
assigned all their existing forces to NATO in the integrated military system. 155 
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One of the most delicate issues concerning the future of the European Union’s 
planning process has been the mechanism for force planning. To be able to perform the 
full range of Petersberg tasks and match ambitions with tangible military capabilities the 
EU needs an effective force planning mechanism. It was clear from the beginning that the 
WEU defense planning mechanism (Forces Answerable to WEU or “FAWEU” database) 
would not be sufficient to conduct the EU’s force planning. The question was whether to 
employ NATO’s well-established force planning system or to establish a comparable but 
separate EU planning process.156  
On the one hand, since France does not participate in NATO integrated military 
force planning, Paris did not favor the first option and argued for independent European 
Union defense planning. On the other hand, NATO nations are reluctant to set up a 
separate EU planning process parallel to the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) or 
the Planning and Review Process (PARP) available  to the Partnership for Peace countries 
and their national military planning systems.157 
Following the spirit of the Helsinki and Feira declarations a Headline Goal Task 
Force (HTF) was established in order to develop “the Headline and collective capabilities 
goals…in accordance with the decision-making autonomy of the EU as well as the 
requirements regarding military efficiency.”158 The June 2000 Feira report called for 
close consultation among the EU Member States and required coherence with NATO’s 
defense planning process and the Planning and Review Process. 
With the help of NATO experts (HTF Plus), the EU further elaborated its needs in 
terms of military capabilities to meet the headline goal. By the summer of 2000 a 120-
page catalogue (Force Catalogue) had been proposed. The catalogue helped the EU 
nations to identify the military requirements, and they made pledges to meet many of 
them at the Capabilities Commitment Conference on 20 November 2000. The conference 
was considered broadly successful as the EU countries offered considerably more than 
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some observers had expected: 100,000 troops, 100 ships, and 400 aircraft for the Helsinki 
Force Catalogue.159 (Table 1)160 
 
Table 1.    
Force Pledges of the EU member nations, at the November 2000 EU Capabilities 
Commitment Conference 
 
EU nations: Forces: 
Germany 13,500 
United Kingdom 12,500 
France 12,000 
Italy   6,000 
Spain   6,000 
Netherlands   5,000 
Greece   3,500 
Austria   2,000 
Finland   2,000 
Sweden   1,500 
Belgium   1,000 
Ireland   1,000 
Portugal   1,000 




It was obvious to both NATO and EU leaders that maintaining two separate 
planning systems could cause serious tension between the organizations. The argument 
for close cooperation was perhaps best articulated by U.S. Secretary of Defense William 
Cohen at the NATO informal ministerial meeting in Birmingham in October 2000. 
Secretary Cohen made a proposal for the design of an effective planning system, based 
primarily on the idea of a single process fully open to every NATO and EU country 
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(twenty-three in all).161 “In regard to defense planning, which would not be directly 
affected by crisis operations, we would envision a unitary, coherent, and collaborative 
approach that meets the needs of both NATO and the EU. I could very well imagine this 
unitary approach taking the form of a ‘European Security and Defense Planning System,’ 
or ‘ESDPS’.”162 However, the Turkish decision at that time to block NATO consensus 
halted the negotiation and complicated the dialogue between NATO and the EU. 
At the same time, NATO and the EU established an efficient working relationship 
through the HTF Plus format. “In order to avoid unnecessary duplication,” - says the 
declaration of the Capabilities Commitment Conference,  
it will, for the Member States concerned, rely on technical data emanating 
from existing NATO mechanisms such as the Defence Planning Process 
and the Planning and Review Process (PARP). Recourse to these sources 
would be had, with the support of the EU Military Staff (EUMS), via 
consultations between experts in a working group set up on the same 
model as that which operated for the drawing up of the capabilities 
catalogue (HTF Plus). In addition, exchange of information and 
transparency would be appropriately ensured between the Union and 
NATO by the Working Group on Capabilities set up between the two 
organisations, which would take steps to ensure the coherent development 
of EU and NATO capabilities where they overlap.163 
 
In light of the above, in December 2000 the European Council at Nice defined a 
mechanism for future EU force planning. The Appendix to Annex I to Annex VI, entitled 
“Achievement of the Headline Goal Review Mechanism for Military Capabilities,” 
elaborates both the EU review mechanism and the EU evaluation process. The review 
mechanism has three specific aims: 
 
(a) to enable the EU to monitor and facilitate progress towards the 
honouring of undertakings to achieve the overall goal, in both quantitative 
and qualitative terms; 
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(b) to enable the EU to evaluate and, if necessary, to review its defined 
capability goals in order to meet the requirements of the full range of 
Petersberg tasks in the light of changing circumstances; 
(c) to help to achieve consistency between the pledges undertaken in the 
EU framework and, for the countries concerned, the headline goal force 
agreed to in the context of NATO planning or the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP).164 
The review mechanism has to pay particular attention to the preservation of the 
EU’s autonomy in decision making, while transparency, simplicity and clarity are also 
essential in order to enable comparisons among the Member States. The process has to 
respect “the political and voluntary nature of the commitments” and at the same time it 
has to be flexible to adapt to newly identified needs.165 The EU-NATO dialogue should 
be maintained to ensure the compatibility of the EU and NATO commitments, to 
reinforce the Alliance’s Defense Capabilities Initiative, and to avoid unnecessary 
duplications. 
Concerning the EU evaluation process the Appendix states that “The process will 
continue to be based on the method used with success initially in the elaboration of the 
headline goal, in particular the involvement of Member State and NATO experts through 
expert groups based on the Headline Task Force/Headline Task Force Plus (HTF/HTF 
Plus) format, with the EUMS assisting in the process of elaborating, evaluating and 
reviewing capability goals in accordance with its remit.”166  
In the newly established EU structure, the EUMS will monitor force planning 
with the  assistance of NATO expertise in the HTF Plus format. The EUMS functions 
under the direction of the EU Military Committee, which is required to report 
shortcomings and make recommendations to the PSC regarding the fulfillment of the 
national pledges. The working group on EU/NATO capabilities is also supposed to 
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facilitate the transparent exchange of information and the dialogue between the two 
organizations.167  
 
A possible division of labor may be at hand concerning defense planning. It 
appears that in the near future the EU will be able to conduct strategic planning, including 
generic planning for the full scale Petersberg tasks. In the meanwhile, NATO will 
continue force planning in close cooperation with the EU. The EU does not, however, 
have operational force planning capability. Operational planning will be carried out either 
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V. THE ESDP’S MAJOR CHALLENGES  
The EU’s ESDP faces three major challenges: the lack of a Strategic Concept, the 
insufficient defense budgets of the EU member states, and the capability gap between the 
EU member states (and the non-EU NATO European allies) and the United States. This 
chapter examines these challenges in relation to a more specific one: the achievement of 
an autonomous European Union defense planning capability. 
 
A. LACK OF AN EU STRATEGIC CONCEPT  
The most immediate challenge is to develop at least some sort of Strategic 
Concept explaining the strategic goals of the European Union and how it intends to 
achieve them. First of all, there is an overlap between NATO and the EU in that both 
organizations have expressed a willingness to undertake all of the so-called “Petersberg 
tasks” missions. In 1992 NATO announced its willingness to conduct peacekeeping 
operations on a case-by-case basis under the authority of the United Nations or what was 
then called the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was 
renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1994.168 In 
the last decade the Alliance has proved to be the only organization capable of bringing 
stability and peace to the Balkans. 
According to the European Council decisions at Nice, “NATO remains the basis 
of the collective defence of its members and will continue to play an important role in 
crisis management.”169 The European Council also approved the following description of 
its goals for the ESDP:  
In developing this autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where 
NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military 
operations in response to international crises, the European Union will be 
able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks as defined in the Treaty 
on European Union: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks 
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and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking. 170  
So far the European Union has rigidly stuck to the Peterberg tasks formula – that 
is, expecting the EU’s military forces to become capable of accomplishing the full range 
of Petersberg tasks, “including the most demanding.” 171 This formula is hardly sufficient 
as a description of the EU’s ambitions. For example, the full range of Petersberg tasks 
could be construed as embracing all kinds of military operations intended to restore 
peace, including military interventions such as the Korean War (1950-53) and the Gulf 
War (1990-1991). Even a serious humanitarian intervention could call for large-scale 
expeditionary forces.172 
It is hard to believe that the EU member states considered the above-mentioned 
examples as models for common EU military action. According to Heisbourg, the 
European Union nations are fairly divided concerning the EU’s security role. Nations 
with an imperial legacy, such as Britain and France, have an extravert tendency to be 
prepared for major collective peacekeeping and peacemaking operations on a global 
scale. At the other end of the spectrum are the four non-allied, neutral EU countries, 
(Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden), which are reluctant to participate in peace 
enforcement operations. The rest of the EU countries lie between these two extremes.173 
The Petersberg tasks formula does not make a clear distinction between “upper” 
and “lower” level tasks as the relevant NATO documents do. According to the AJP-01(b) 
and AJP3.4.1’PSO’ NATO documents, lower order operations are basically non-
combatant operations and upper level operations imply the employment of military 
combat means.174 By contrast EU member states consider the lower level Petersberg 
Tasks “neither politically sensitive nor militarily demanding,” while the King’s College 
London research group defined “the upper level of the Petersberg Tasks are ‘those 
                                                 
170 Ibid., p. 168. 
171 Heisbourg, European Defence: Making it Work, p. 80. 
172 Ibid., p. 22. 
173 Ibid., p. 21. 
174 Achieving the Helsinki Headline Goals, Centre for Defence Studies, King’s Collage London, 
Discussion Paper, November 2001. para. 3.1-3.3 
53 
activities which the Europeans acting under the auspices of the EU, are prepared to, or 
would like to be able to, perform, short of national territorial defence’.”175 In short, the 
Petersberg task terminology is “not distinguished by the levels of force involved but 
rather the description, and the mandate, of the mission itself.”176 
Furthermore, proponents of the Petersberg Tasks envision three types of EU 
military operations: large-scale or “Kosovo-type” operations that NATO would probably 
conduct, medium-scale operations which would require the EU to rely on NATO assets, 
and small-scale actions that the EU could handle on its own.177 There is, however, a 
major difference in the approaches of the two leading European nations. While the British 
are inclined to put more emphasis on the first two types of operations, the French tend to 
concentrate on the “more autonomous” latter two tasks.178 
Additionally, a major difference concerns geographical boundaries. NATO has 
clearly defined boundaries for the application of Article 5 obligations in Article 6 of the 
Washington Treaty, while the EU’s ESDP – as articulated in the Petersberg Tasks – does 
not have geographical boundaries.179 France clearly intends to promote the EU’s 
development as a global actor, while the United Kingdom insists that ESDP should 
strengthen rather than challenge NATO.180  
The European Union has “a hypothesis of a theater off operations 4,000 
kilometers distant from European bases.”181 This is hardly sufficient, in view of the 
statements made by some European leaders. The EU High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, “is already talking about an EU which might 
want to act in Africa as well as in East Timor, and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
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has argued that ‘[t]he Europe of the future must be able to defend its interests and values 
effectively worldwide.’”182  
The future of Article V of the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, is also 
uncertain. The Amsterdam Treaty declares that one of the objectives of the European 
Union is “the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to 
a common defence.”183 According to Jolyon Howorth, Paris would prefer to “deep 
freeze” the issue; this would allow France to revive it if necessary in the future. In 
contrast, the UK holds that Article V of the Brussels Treaty is irrelevant “since collective 
defence is covered by NATO’s Article 5.”184  
 
B. EUROPEAN DEFENSE BUDGETS.  
A more practical facet of the work on ESDP is the readiness of EU members to 
invest in the new project. This is much easier said than done. The provision of resources 
for the ESDP project would require both an increase and restructuring of defense budgets 
– issues that most governments are usually reluctant to raise due to public sensitivities. 
This is another of the pitfalls facing the ESDP. The tables with the defense expenditure of 
West European NATO member states, with the notable exception of Greece, show a 
general trend toward a reduction in the resources allocated for defense. (Table 2)185  
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Table 2.    
Defence budgets and procurement spending in West European NATO members 
and the United States, 1995-99 
Defence budget Constant 
 1997 $USm 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
W Europe      
Belgium 3,534 3,186 2,806 2,723 2,588 
Denmark 3,250 3,099 2,726 2,652 2,395 
France 42,240 37,861 32,711 30,703 28,353 
Germany 34,625 32,745 26,641 26,002 23,790 
Greece 3,473 3,598 3,648 3,867 3,675 
Italy 16,619 20,680 18,237 17,495 15,609 
Luxembourg 128 124 109 105 98 
Netherlands 8,775 8,249 6,992 6,869 6,797 
Norway 3,901 3,820 3,597 3,099 3,070 
Portugal 1,869 1,755 1,698 1,554 1,564 
Spain 7,243 7,014 5,942 5,888 5,464 
UK 35,725 34,196 35,736 36,111 33,254 
Subtotal 161,382 156,327 140,843 137,068 126,657 
US 274,624 271,739 257,975 253,423 252,379 
Total 436,006 428,066 398,818 390,491 379,0 
Equipment procurement Constant 
 1997 $USm 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
W Europe      
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Belgium 293 217 192 203 183 
Denmark 406 384 339 351 322 
France 7,952 7,588 6,465 5,620 5,242 
Germany 3,969 3,705 2,956 3,455 3,715 
Greece 1,022 1,146 1,146 1,287 1,273 
Italy 1,642 2,026 2,100 2,394 1,905 
Luxembourg 3 7 6 5 5 
Netherlands 1,338 1,578 1,324 1,581 1,380 
Norway 826 839 906 773 691 
Portugal 140 263 352 365 400 
Spain 998 1,243 1,012 781 744 
UK 7,334 8,189 8,466 9,354 8,263 
Subtotal 25,923 27,185 25,264 26,169 24,123 
US 46,251 43,332 42,930 43,887 47,052 
Total 72,174 70,517 68,194 70,056 71,175 
 
 
As the result of the reduction, the EU member states spend 60% of the US total 
($126 billion against $252 billion in 1999). It is hard to imagine a swift reverse in this 
trend in the short term. But even with a view to the long-term defense budget 
development it is impossible to foresee an increase unless currently unanticipated events 
convince EU governments that more spending is necessary. Without such decisions the 
ESDP project may remain confined to limited practical development as well as to 
elaborate institutional mechanisms within the EU and between the European Union and 
NATO. 
The Europeans not only spend smaller proportions of their GDPs on defense, but 
they also spend these smaller amounts less efficiently. They spend significantly more on 
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personnel and less on procurement than the United States.186 The most striking example 
concerns Germany, Greece and Italy, which have forces that total 760,000, which is 55% 
of the US forces, whereas they collectively spend only 10% of the American expenditure 
on procurement. As a result the EU countries spend around half of what the United States 
devotes to equipment purchases. 187 
Burdensharing has been a delicate issue since the beginning of the Alliance. 
Although the Europeans are reluctant to increase their military budgets, they play a 
greater role than the United States in providing financial assistance to Central and Eastern 
Europe as well as in peacekeeping in the Balkans. In 1991-1997, Germany provided $15 
billion in loans and grants to the Central and Eastern European countries, including the 
former Soviet republics. The second largest donor was the United States with $11.7 
billion in aid to the region. 188 One of the reasons might be that the EU countries are 
inclined to respond to the new challenges by promoting dialogue, stimulating economic 
activity, and providing financial aid rather than by using military force. According to a 
recent article about EU-US policy differences, “[T]he European Union spends about $30 
billion a year on development assistance, nearly three times the U.S. figure.”189 
The EU has also played a greater role than the United States in providing 
economic assistance and peacekeeping support in the Balkans. As NATO Secretary 
General Robertson said in April 2000:  
In Kosovo, European nations are providing 80% of all the forces for the 
KFOR peacekeeping force, with the largest troop contributor being Italy. 
Out of an allied force of about 45,000 troops, the U.S. now provides 
6,000.  
European nations are, as they promised picking up the lion’s share of 
reconstruction efforts in the Balkans. The European Union has provided 
about $16.5 billion to this region since 1991 and has budgeted nearly $12 
billion for the next six years. Although the U.S. is the single largest 
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provider of troops for the international police force in Kosovo, at roughly 
15%, the EU countries provide 40%.190 
It is also noteworthy that NATO established a well-balanced budget system 
during the Cold War to finance the Alliance’s common costs. Although NATO mainly 
relies on the military contributions of the member nations, it has a common budget of 
approximately $800 million a year, which covers three major areas: the civil budget, the 
military budget, and the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP). This budget pays 
for the Alliance’s civil and military headquarters as well as for the improvement of the 
infrastructure. European nations, especially Germany (19.6%) and the UK (15.5%), made 
major contributions, while the U.S. share was set around 25% in 1951.191 For example, 
over the last ten years ending in 1999, the US facilities received approximately $4.1 
billion from the NSIP, while the United States contributed $2.7 billion to the program. 192  
Burdensharing issues will certainly emerge among the EU Member States. Since 
the force commitments are based on voluntary national contributions, it is extremely 
difficult to persuade the member nations to spend more on defense than they intend to 
spend. Depending on their definition of the requirements of the Petersberg tasks, the 
estimates of experts range from $32 billion to $42 billion in defense investment increases 
over the next decade. An extra $25 billion will also be required for collective investments 
over the same period with an increase of about 10% for new military equipment.193  
According to a recent Rand Study, “Apart from resources that might be generated 
from economic growth, a second source could, in principle, be reallocations in existing 
government budgets from nondefense to defense purposes – for example, from public 
subsidization of agriculture or from various entitlements.”194 However, the RAND 
authors admit that large increases in the defense budgets are highly unlikely. Funding 
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might also be derived from “the reallocation of existing military spending and military 
investments from their somewhat ‘backward- looking’ focus –for example, on heavy 
tanks, artillery, surface ships, etc., all relating to World War II imagery – to a more 
forward-looking, high-technology, C4I, air-mobile, and deployable set of capabilities.”195 
The problem with this suggestion is that it would require further investments and could 
cause significant layoffs in the European defense industry. Although the suggestion is 
reasonable in a long term perspective, it would require changes in the perceptions of the 
Europeans about probable military operations. 
Considerable savings could be realized by replacing national procurement with a 
supranational arrangement. Liberalized and competitive bidding could result in a 10 
to17% annual savings in defense procurement, which would be approximately $10 to $15 
billion in savings annually.196 Despite the permanent debate relating to multinational 
production and procurement in Europe, there are indeed some promising signs, like the 
Eurofighter and the Airbus A-400M projects. The $30 billion program to produce 620 
Eurofighter aircraft begins in 2002 as a joint venture of Germany, Italy, Spain and the 
United Kingdom. Seven European allies have pledged to co-produce and purchase 225 
A-400M Airbus transport aircraft by 2007.197 
The French Minister of Defence, Alain Richard, suggested at a meeting in Sintra 
on 28 February 2000 a figure of 0.7% of GDP for acquisition of equipments as a goal for 
EU member nations. If the British benchmark of procurement (39.6%) became the EU 
average, “overall capital spending would jump from $35.6 bn to $52.1 bn.”198 Moreover, 
François Heisbourg has pointed out, “If the EU 15 spent 0.7 per cent of their GDP 
($8,500 bn) on equipment (including R&D)…the aggregate would be close to $60 bn, 
versus $36.5 bn today (and compared with a US total of $82.4 bn).”199  
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It became evident during NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo conflict in 1999 that 
the military capabilities gap between the United States and its NATO European Allies 
was significant. The United States conducted 80% of the strike sorties and provided 90% 
of the air-to-air refueling capability. Furthermore, the United States was in many cases 
the only nation (or almost the only one) able to provide offensive electronic warfare, 
airborne command and control, all-weather precision guided munitions, and mobile target 
acquisition. An average of three American support aircraft was needed for every 
European strike sortie.200 The European shortfalls were sobering. As a RAND study 
concluded, “lack of advanced munitions and of specialized support aircraft marginalized 
the allies’ contribution to the air war over Yugoslavia.”201 
Explanations for the gap reside in a combination of historical and economic 
factors. For decades NATO European troops prepared for war somewhere in the heart of 
the continent. In contrast with the United States, which had to send reinforcements across 
the Atlantic Ocean, most Europeans did not need force projection capabilities: the enemy 
was expected to come to them.202 History can explain the origins of the current military 
postures in Western Europe, but it is remarkable that more than ten years after the end of 
the Cold War in 1989-91 most of the West European militaries are still primarily 
concerned with territorial defense. This situation has persisted, even though it became 
obvious in the last decade that new types of security challenges are calling for local 
military intervention. 
The US-European capability gap derives from a combination of technology and 
investment as well as procurement gaps.203 The main question is whether the EU’s 
headline goal capabilities will be adequate to enable the EU to conduct full-scale 
Petersberg task missions. According to François Heisbourg, there are several unanswered 
questions related to the size of the headline goal force. The 60,000 troops would probably 
provide only 20,000 combat forces as the rest of the troops would serve in support 
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functions. Such a fighting force would not be sufficient in a non-permissive environment, 
and in the best case it would be able to conduct a KFOR-type peacekeeping operation. A 
large-scale peacemaking operation would require 50,000 to 60,000 combat forces, which 
would imply a headline goal between 150,000 and 180,000.204 
Troop sustainability is also a problem, as the member states are required to 
maintain their contribution for one year in a six-month rotation. This means that in reality 
the member countries are required to sustain at least two reserve units for each unit 
deployed. Owing to the fact that many of the EU countries still rely on conscription, only 
a limited number of professional soldiers are available. For constitutional reasons the 
conscripts in most countries can be used only for collective self-defense, which makes the 
availability of the forces for peacekeeping and other interventions also questionable.205 
Important differences persist between the American and the European approaches 
to military operations. The American military forces rely more heavily on technology and 
less on troops on the ground than do their European counterparts. In some circumstances, 
a separate EU force would represent a traditional “low-tech” force largely composed of 
conscripts, while the United States would organize a large “high-tech” force with 
professional soldiers.206 
Besides increasing the number of its rapidly deployable troops, the EU also needs 
to make progress in developing the capabilities required for the most demanding 
Petersberg missions. The November 2000 Capability Commitment Conference identified 
several areas “in which efforts will be made in upgrading existing assets, investment, 
development and coordination so as gradually to acquire or enhance the capabilities 
required for autonomous EU action.”207 Some EU Member States have decided “to 
develop and coordinate monitoring and early warning military means; - to open existing 
joint national headquarters to officers coming from other Member States; - to reinforce 
the rapid reaction capabilities of existing European multinational forces; - to prepare the 
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establishment of a European air transport command; - to increase the number of readily 
deployable troops; - and to enhance strategic sea lift capacity.”208 
The declaration elaborates on the current situation and the work ahead. According 
to the document, there are two areas in which the EU has made significant progress. In 
the area of command, control and communications (C3) “the Member States offered a 
satisfactory number of national or multinational headquarters at strategic, operational, 
force and component levels.”209 The other area is intelligence, in which “apart from the 
image interpretation capabilities of the Torrejon Satellite Centre,”210 the member states 
pledged to put some of their national resources at the EU’s disposal. However, both C3 
and intelligence sharing need further improvement.  
Additionally, Member States committed themselves to continue military reforms 
to improve the availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability of their 
armed forces. These efforts will include “strengthening essential operational 
capabilities,”211 such as search and rescue, defense against ground-to-ground missiles, 
precision weapons, logistic support, and simulation tools. Major projects, such as the 
Future Large Aircraft (Airbus A 400M), maritime transport vessels, and Troop Transport 
Helicopters (NH 90), have been launched in the European armaments industry. 
Moreover, some Member States announced their intention to “acquire equipment to 
improve the safety and efficiency of military action,” while others “undertook to improve 
the Union’s guaranteed access to satellite imaging.”212 
Despite the newly established communications links of communication between 
NATO and the EU, NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and the EU’s Headline 
Goal differ in some key areas. NATO’s DCI originated in a U.S. proposal, and it was 
approved by the allies in April 1999 at the Washington Summit. The allied nations 
pledged to improve their military capabilities in five vital areas: (1.) deployability and 
mobility, (2.) sustainability and logistics, (3.) effective engagement capability (4.) 
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survivability of the forces and (5.) command, control, and information systems. NATO’s 
DCI places more emphasis on “effective engagement.”213 According to a NATO Press 
Release, “In this context, increased attention must be paid to human factors (such as 
common approaches to doctrine, training and operational procedures) and 
standardization.”214 Power projection, precision munitions, defenses against biological 
and chemical weapons, defenses against cruise and ballistic missiles, and electronic 
warfare also play a larger role in NATO’s DCI than in the EU’s plan. 215 This may be 
partly attributed to the fact that NATO still has collective defense responsibilities. Article 
5 operations might be more demanding than the Petersberg Tasks, at least in some 
circumstances.  
 
The intention of the EU to make efforts in “upgrading existing assets, investment, 
development and coordination so as gradually to acquire or enhance the capabilities 
required for autonomous EU action”216 is directly related to the size of defense budget 
allocations for this purpose. Today only France and the United Kingdom have 
sufficiently large defense budgets and extensive research, development and procurement 
programs to ensure notable progress in this direction. EU members must recognize that if 
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Following World War II, NATO succeeded in establishing an effective defense 
planning process and created an integrated military system. The Alliance’s multilateral 
planning process, based on transparency and consultation among the members, enabled 
the Western European allies to focus on economic recovery during the 1950s and 1960s. 
However, it failed to ensure balanced burden-sharing and the development of robust 
military postures by all of its European members. It was the permanent Soviet threat and 
America’s commitment to Europe that sustained NATO during the Cold War.  
At the end of the Cold War NATO responded quickly to the new political-military 
challenges and proved to be the most effective organization dealing with security matters 
in Europe. During the course of the 1990s the NATO Allies agreed that the European 
Allies should play a larger role in international security affairs. The Alliance established 
an official relationship with the WEU providing for defense planning and WEU access to 
NATO assets and capabilities. However, the March-June 1999 Kosovo campaign 
convinced key European Union leaders that more should be done. The European Council 
decided in 1999 that the European Union must develop the capabilities necessary to cope 
with humanitarian crises and to perform other operations known as the Petersberg Tasks. 
The focus thus shifted from the ESDI (European Security and Defense Identity), 
implying more European capability within NATO, to ESDP (European Security and 
Defense Policy), implying autonomous EU capabilities in close cooperation with NATO. 
Whereas NATO was initially formed in response to a specific threat, the EU’s 
ESDP is being organized to perform the generic missions known as the Petersberg Tasks. 
The lack of a tangible foreign threat and insufficient defense budgets make the prospects 
for success of the ESDP uncertain. It is not clear how committed to ESDP development 
are the United Kingdom and France, the two leading powers behind it. It is too early to 
conclude that the United Kingdom has given up its Atlanticist convictions for the sake of 
the European Union. Indeed, the British clearly intend to preserve and enhance NATO 
while developing the EU’s ESDP. France, on the other hand, is striving to minimize the 
influence of NATO in EU affairs. Turkey, an influential member of NATO and a 
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candidate for EU membership, wants to have a greater voice in EU decisions and 
operations affecting international security, particularly in Turkey’s vicinity. 
Defense planning is vital because the arrangements in this regard will influence 
the future of the EU and NATO as well as the transatlantic relationship. An official 
relationship has been established between NATO and the EU, and this has enabled the 
two organizations to conduct negotiations about institutional mechanisms for effective 
cooperation. It seems that the EU’s defense planning capability will be limited in certain 
ways. The Nice Presidency Conclusion implies that the EU strategic planning will be 
conducted by the EUMS under the supervision of the EUMC and in close cooperation 
with NATO’s International Military Staff. The EU will not establish a standing command 
structure analogous to NATO’s SHAPE. Operational planning for an EU-led operation is 
supposed to be provided either by NATO staff under the guidance of the DSACEUR or 
by a lead nation among the participating EU nations.  
The Nice document contains the EU’s proposal for institutionalizing NATO-EU 
relations. This proposal has not yet been approved by NATO. Some NATO Allies may 
have concerns because the proposal excludes the non-EU European Allied nations from 
the EU’s strategic planning and limits their role in decision-making about the conduct of 
EU-led operations, although officially it declares that the EU will not conduct military 
operational planning. In view of the democratic political systems of both the NATO and 
EU nations as well as the already existing cooperation between NATO and the EU, the 
EU’s defense planning activities probably will not have a major impact on NATO’s 
decision-making structures and defense planning process. The EU nations recognize 
NATO’s primary role in European security matters. They have declared that the EU will 
only take action when the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily. The cooperation 
between EU and NATO experts will, it may be hoped, have positive effects, notably in 
promoting more efficient use of scarce European resources and in providing transparency 
between the Alliance and the European Union.  
 
However, the ESDP appears unlikely to persuade the European Union nations to 
increase their defense budgets. It will therefore probably not be able to narrow the 
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significant capability gap between the United States and its European allies. Although the 
ESDP’s objectives are less ambitious than those of the Alliance, performing the upper 
level Peterberg tasks would require military capabilities similar to those of the Alliance. 
The fledgling defense planning activities in a cooperative framework by NATO and the 
EU have an important function in avoiding unnecessary duplication, but these activities 
will not be able to boost the military spending of the Europeans. That would require 
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